In a conditional proxy re-encryption (C-PRE) 
Introduction
Proxy re-encryption (PRE), introduced by Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss [1] , enables a semi-trusted proxy to transform Alice's ciphertext into Bob's ciphertext of the same message without revealing the underlying message. PRE has found lots of applications such as distributed file system and outsourced filtering of encrypted spam [2] . Rather than allowing the proxy to convert all of Alice's ciphertext, Alice may only want the proxy to convert the ciphertexts that satisfies a certain condition. To overcome this problem, Weng, Deng and Ding [3] introduced the notion of conditional proxy re-encryption, whereby only ciphertext satisfying one certain condition set by Alice can be transformed by the proxy. Similarly to Weng's work [3] , Libert and Vergnaud [4] proposed a PRE scheme that provides warrant-based and keyword-based delegations in PKC08. Later, Tang proposed a notion called typed-based proxy re-encryption [5] . To achieve anonymous on conditions, Fang, Susilo and Wang proposed an anonymous conditional proxy reencryption scheme [6] .
In the former C-PRE, the condition is set to be a specific keyword, thus the C-PRE cannot enable a more flexible combination of keywords. To overcome this problem, Fang [7] proposed the notion of fuzzy conditional proxy re-encryption. Whereby, ciphertext is encrypted with a condition set , and proxy re-encryption key is generated with a condition set . The proxy is able to convert the ciphertext if and only if and are close to each other as measured by the "set overlap" distance metric. Unfortunately, their scheme is interactive, which means Alice and Bob should interact to generate the reencryption key. This is undesirable as Bob should be on line when doing the delegation.
Moreover, their scheme is proved against chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) secure in the random oracle model, unfortunately, a proof in the random oracle model can only servers as a heuristic argument and admittedly using quite contrived constructions, it has been shown in [8] to possibly lead to insecure schemes when the random oracles are implemented in the standard model.
Our Contributions
This paper aims to resolving the aforementioned open problems. In this paper, we present a non-interactive fuzzy conditional proxy re-encryption scheme. Furthermore, our scheme is proved CCA secure under the 3-weak decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman inversion (3-wDBDHI) assumption without random oracles.
Paper Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives some preliminaries, the definitions and complexity assumption and the security model of FC-PRE schemes. In section 3, we present our non-interactive FC-PRE scheme and prove its security in the standard model. In section 4, we conclude the paper.
Preliminaries

Negligible Function
A function is said to be negligible if for all , there exists a such that for all .
Bilinear Map
Let and be two multiplicative cyclic groups with the same prime order , and be a generator of . A bilinear pairing is a map with the following properties [9, 10] :
1. for all and 2. . 3. There is an efficient algorithm to compute for all
The 3-wDBDHI Assumption
Let be a bilinear map. We define the advantage function of an adversary as:
Where are randomly chosen. We say that the 3-wDBDHI assumption [11] relative to generator holds if is negligible for all PPT .
Pseudorandom Function Family
We here review the definition of pseudorandom function family [11] . Let be a function family, where is the set of keys of , is the domain, and is the range. Let be a true random function family. Let be a PPT adversary which outputs a bit. We consider the following two experiments:
We define 's advantage in attacking the pseudorandom of the function as .
If for any PPT adversary , his advantage in attacking the pseudorandomness of the function family is negligible, the we say that is a pesudorandom function family.
Fuzzy Conditional Proxy Re-encryption
In this section, we review the definition and security notions for FC-PRE [7] . Definition 1 (Fuzzy conditional proxy re-encryption). A (single-hop) fuzzy conditional proxy re-encryption scheme consists the following eight algorithms:
On input a security parameter , the global public parameters are outputted.
 KeyGen( ): The KeyGen algorithm outputs the public key and secret key for user .
On input the delegator's secret key , the conditional keywords set , and the delegatee's public key , outputs the conditional re-encryption key . 
FC-PRE-IND-CCA Game
Next we consider the following two games, which correspond to the security of the first level ciphertext and the second level ciphertext individually.
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Game1: IND-level2-CCA game, which considers the security of level2 ciphertext.
Setup. The challenger perform
to get the public parameter . Give the public parameter to the adversary .
Query phase 1. The adversary . makes the following queries:
 Uncorrupted key generation query : The challenger first runs algorithm to obtain a public/secret key pair , and then sends to the adversary .
 Corrupted key generation query
: The challenger first runs algorithm to obtain a public/secret key pair , and then sends to the adversary .
 Re-encryption key query : The challenger runs algorithm to generate a conditional re-encryption key and returns it to the adversary . It is required that and have been generated beforehand by algorithm .
 Re-encryption query : The challenger runs algorithm and returns the resulting ciphertext to the adversary . It is required that and have been generated beforehand by algorithm .
 Decryption query : Here denotes the queries on original conditional ciphertext. Challenger returns the result of to . It is required that has been generated beforehand by algorithm  Decryption query : Here denotes the queries on reencrypted ciphertext. Challenger returns the result of to . It is required that has been generated beforehand by algorithm .
3. Challenge. Once decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs two equal length message . Challenger chooses a bit and sets the challenge ciphertext to be , which is sent to . 4. Query phase 2. continues making queries as in the query phase 1.
Guess. outputs the guess . The adversary wins if .
During the above game, adversary is subject to the following restrictions:
 cannot issue corrupted key generation queries on to obtain the target secret key .
 cannot issue decryption queries on neither nor where is a re-encryption of the challenge pair .
 cannot issue re-encryption queries on , if and appears in a previous corrupted key generation query.
 cannot obtain the conditional re-encryption key , if and appears in a previous corrupted key generation query.
We refer to the above adversary as an IND-L2-CCA adversary. His advantage is defined as .
Proposed non-interactive FC-PRE scheme
Construction
Let be bilinear group of prime order , and be a generator of . Additionally, let denote the bilinear map.
We also define the Lagrange coefficient for and a set , of elements in :
Our proposed scheme consists of the following algorithms:
 GlobalSetup : Let be the security parameter, and be the bilinear map parameters. Let be the "set overlap" distance metric, which means that the proxy is able to perform re-encryption if and only if at least components of the second level ciphertext with their re-encryption key components. denotes the message space. Correctness. It is straightforward to verify that all the correctly generated original/reencrypted ciphertexts can be correctly decrypted.
Security of our FC-PRE Scheme
In this subsection, we prove the FC-PRE-IND-CCA security for our scheme without random oracles. The analysis of Game 1 and Game 2 are as follows. Proof. Our approach to proving lemma 1 closely follows the security proof for Weng's scheme [11] and the Fuzzy IBE scheme [12] . In the following, we call be the set of honest parties, including the target user , and be the set of corrupt parties. first generates an keyword set that it intends to attack.
We let the challenger set the group and with an efficient bilinear map and a generator of . inputs a 3-wDBDHI instance and has to distinguish from a random element in .
Next, sets up the global parameters as follows: sets the generators for a randomly chosen
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. Finally, samples a pairwise independent hash functions , such that . Without loose of generality, assume that are target collision resistant and is a pesudorandom function family. The system parameters are .
 Uncorrupted key: On input to , public keys of honest users are defined as follows: select a random , then computes .
The target user's public key is set as for randomly chosen . Sends public key to .
 Corrupted key: On input to , public keys of corrupted user are defined as follows: select a random , then computes . Sends public and private key to .
 Re-encryption key query : Consider a query for the re-encryption key corresponding to a conditional set , the only restriction is that when and , otherwise abort and output .
If the above condition is met, randomly chooses , let , , to answer the Re-encryption key query , has to distinguish several situations:
(a). If , since knows the private key for user , can compute the conditional re-encryption as the re-encryption key generation algorithm.
(b). If , first defines three sets in the following manner: , be any set such that and , and .
Next, we define the re-encryption key components and for as:
If :
Where , are chosen randomly in .
Where are randomly chosen in .
(c). If , outputs a random bit in and abort.
Next, computes as the Enc algorithm. Thus, can derive a valid re-encryption key for . 
Then compute . Notice that, in equation , the quality mod holds with probability at most .
(c). If , output " " indicating an invalid ciphertext. Otherwise, output .
(d). Using , can get as the Dec1 algorithm.
 Second level decryption query : On given a second level ciphertext , first checks whether the equations (1)- (3) . On the other hand, when is uniform in , the challenge ciphertext is independent of in the adversary's view.
Lemma 2.
If there exists an IND-L1-CCA adversary against our scheme, then there exists an algorithm which can solve the 3-wDBDHI problem.
Proof. Suppose there exists a polynomial-time adversary that can attack our scheme in the standard model. In the following, we call be the set of honest parties, including the target user , and be the set of corrupt parties. first generates an keyword set that it intends to attack.
We let the challenger set the group and with an efficient bilinear map and a generator of . Simulator inputs a 3-wDBDHI instance and has to distinguish from a random element in .
Next, sets up the global parameters as follows: sets the generators for a randomly chosen . Without loose of generality, assume that are target collision resistant and is a pesudorandom function family.
Output the system parameters .
 Uncorrupted key generation query : Public keys of honest user (including target public key) are defined as follows: select a random , then computes . Sends public key to .
 Corrupted key generation query : Public keys of corrupted user are defined as follows: select a random , then computes . Sends public and private key to .
 Re-encryption key query : Consider a query for the re-encryption key corresponding to a conditional set , the only restriction is that when and , otherwise abort and output . If the above condition is met, selects a random value and proceeds as follows: , be any set such that and , and .
Next, computes as the Enc algorithm. Thus, can derive a valid re-encryption key for .
 First level decryption query
: The same as in Lemma 1.
 Challenge. Once decided that Phase 1 is over, it outputs two equal length plaintexts . chooses a random value and computes as the Enc algorithm. Let , randomly choose , and responds as follows:
Output the challenge ciphertext .
 Query phase 2. continues making queries as in the query phase 1 with the restrictions described in the IND-L2-CCA game.
 Guess. outputs the guess , if , then output meaning ; else output meaning .
Observe that, if , is indeed a valid challenge ciphertext under public key . On the other hand, when is uniform in , the challenge ciphertext is independent of in the adversary's view.
Conclusions and Open Questions
In this paper, we solve the problem left by Fang, Wang, Ge and Ren by proposing a non-interactive fuzzy conditional proxy re-encryption. Furthermore, our scheme is proved CCA secure without random oracles. Many interesting questions still remain to be solved.
Anonymous conditions. Designing FC-PRE schemes with anonymous conditions is very necessary. The technique introduced in [13] might be possible approaches to achieve CCA-secure. We leave it as our future work.
Without pairings. Designing FC-PRE schemes without relying on pairings is also an interesting work, as pairing takes a more computation cost compared with modular exponentiation.
